The Hill
Does the presence of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad still represent a strategic cornerstone for Moscow? Does the future of Russia's presence in Syria depend on the survival of Bashar? Is Russia ready to sacrifice valuable alliances with other nations in order for Bashar to stay in power? What does Russia want with Bashar, exactly? Is Bashar oblivious to Russia’s long-term game-plan ?
These are questions that have been on my mind as of late. Questions that I’ve been trying to address in an attempt to understand the new phase of the Russian bear’s strategy in the Middle East, specifically in Syria. While they may not provide a clear picture, perhaps the answers will help in understanding the fate of Syria on one hand, and the fate of Bashar al-Assad on the other.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s foreign policies took multiple, wildly inconsistent forms. This was to be expected of a state that had its empire collapse in a period that witnessed a fundamental change in the concepts and forms of global interventions in other countries. Global transformations with respect to the concept of occupation have changed in both form and substance.
The world has agreed, in terms of what it knew and did not know, to renounce the traditional means of geographical expansion, whether it’s through invasion or occupation by force, and opted to replace them with more civilized means, such as utilizing cultural and media influences, both of which are hallmarks of economic power.
The absence of any clear political layout for the Russian government makes them stand in two contradictory positions. One position favors direct geographic expansion, as witnessed with the takeover of Crimea, while the other position attempts to be in line with international law by taking advantage of some of the United Nations regulations in order to legitimize its military interventions, thereby justifying their interference in Syria.
Despite the ongoing rivalry between Russia and its Western counterparts, we should not forget the fact that there is a fairly significant portion of Western intellectuals that have spoken in partial and sometimes complete favor of Russia intervening in Syria. This is due to three reasons:
First of all, they have grown impatient with the slow-yielding results of the fight against ISIS under U.S. leadership, so they figured that Moscow could achieve what Washington has not been able to achieve. The second reason is to embroil Russia into the mire and muck of Syria’s politically turbulent state. The third reason is to create a joint collaborative opportunity based on mutual understanding between Moscow and Washington through depicting ISIS as a common enemy.
Even though ISIS threatens global security and stability, they represent the golden opportunity that superpowers have always dreamed of, as there is no way to unite Moscow and Washington without finding a common enemy. This happened in the past with the Nazis, and currently only happens in Hollywood movies where Russia and the United States suddenly become friends in the face of an alien invasion.
Washington and Moscow only view Syria as a convenient boxing ring, and they definitely do not see eye to eye on any of its affairs. Based on a multitude of intelligence reports, the real political boxing rings that are disconcerting for both nations are the Arctic and Eastern Europe, especially since Russia previously indicated that they are about to install military bases in Belarus, as well as their desire to benefit from the creation of Arctic shipping lanes and from gas exploration in the frigid region.
Going back to Bashar: I am certain, without a shadow of a doubt, that the Assad dynasty is nothing more to the Russian political elite than a playing card that has been burnt up by 80%, and that the Russians are now salvaging the rest of the card in order to completely preserve their political interests not only on Syrian grounds, but on surrounding shores and what is commonly known as the Mediterranean “warm waters” as well.
As expected, Russia has proven through its presence in Syria that it is the only guarantor for Bashar, as he asked for the assistance of the Iranians, which they in turn failed to sustain due to the Syrian opposition stopping them in their tracks. This is why Moscow knows for certain that they are his last option, and that Bashar has no choice but to completely give in to Russia’s demands, effectively depriving him of any free will of his own.
Currently, what the Iranians and Bashar’s regime fear the most is that Russia would abandon Bashar after it has completely secured all of its strategic interests, especially since Tehran no longer trusts a more self-serving, less predictable Moscow. This is exemplified by Moscow ceasing to support the Iranian-backed Houthi militias after refusing to veto the UN Security Council resolution 2216 in Yemen.
All signs currently point to a large, polarizing path in Russian politics, as the facts on the ground prove that Russia is trying to find an exit strategy from the Syrian conflict that maximizes its gains, especially since Russia knows that the Syrian people will not accept Bashar’s presence in any means whatsoever, not to mention that it is financially incapable of sustaining a military venture that has no guaranteed outcome.
However, the most important reason of all is Russia’s desire to strengthen strategic and economic ties with Arab Gulf states that roundly reject the presence of Bashar, who has killed more than 400 thousand Syrian citizens and caused the displacement of another 12 million.
The question now is, how will Russia be able to save face in front of its allies in the event that it is forced to make Bashar leave? More importantly, does Russia even need to save face to begin with?